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Abstract
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) content sharing systems are suscepti-
ble to the content pollution attack, in which attackers ag-
gressively inject polluted contents into the systems to re-
duce the availability of authentic contents, thus decreas-
ing the confidence of participating users.
In this paper, we design a pollution-free P2P con-
tent sharing system, Green, by exploiting the inherent
content-based information and the social-based reputa-
tion. In Green, a content provider (i.e., creator or sharer)
publishes the information of his shared contents to a
group of content maintainers self-organized in a security
overlay for providing the mechanisms of redundancy and
reliability, so that a content requestor can obtain and filter
the information of his requested content from the associ-
ated maintainers. We employ a reputation model to help
the requestor better identify the polluted contents, and
then utilize the social (friend-related) information to en-
hance the effectiveness and efficiency of our reputation
model. Now, the requestor could easily select an authen-
tic content version for downloading. While download-
ing, each requestor performs a realtime integrity verifi-
cation and takes prompt protection to handle the content
pollution. To further improve the system performance,
we devise a scalable probabilistic verification scheme.
Green is broadly applicable for both structured and un-
structured overlay applications, and moreover, it is able
to defeat various kinds of content pollution attacks with-
out incurring significant overhead on the participating
users. The evaluation in massive-scale networks vali-
dates the success of Green against the content pollution.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) content sharing systems have experi-
enced an explosive growth since their inception in 1999,
and now dominate large fractions of both the Internet
users and traffic volume [19]. However, due to the de-
centralized and unauthenticated nature, each participat-
ing user has to manage the potential risks involved in the
application transactions without adequate experience and
knowledge about other users.
Recently, many measurement studies reported that
content pollution is pervasive in P2P content sharing sys-
tems, e.g., more than 50% of the copies of popular songs
are polluted in KaZaA [20]. In a typical content pollu-
tion attack, the polluters first collectively tamper with the
target content, degrading its quality or rendering it un-
usable. Then, they inject a massive number of tampered
(i.e., polluted) contents into the system. Unable to distin-
guish between authentic contents and polluted contents,
genuine users download the polluted contents unsuspect-
ingly into their own shared folders, from which other
users may download later without knowing that these
contents have been polluted, thus passively contributing
to the dissemination of pollution. As a result, the pol-
luted contents spread through the whole system at ex-
traordinary speed. Such content pollution has the detri-
mental effects of reducing the availability of the original
authentic content, and ultimately, decreasing the confi-
dence of users in the P2P content sharing system.
In general, the simple digital signature scheme could
be used to defend against content pollution in many Inter-
net applications. Nevertheless, due to the lack of central-
ized trusted authorities in P2P content sharing systems,
the applicability of the signature scheme is questionable.
So far, many pollution defenses have been further pro-
posed, and most of them are built upon reputation mod-
els [8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 32, 33]. These models utilize the
information derived from the participating users’ feed-
back; however, they are penalized by the lack of reliable
user cooperation, and cannot defend against one concrete
pollution attack: identifier corruption (described in sec-
tion 3.2). In this paper, we design Green, a pollution-
free P2P content sharing system. Our main motivation
is to provide a total defense against various kinds of ex-
isting pollution attacks by exploiting not only the tradi-
tional reputation-based information but also the inherent
content-based information and social-based information.
Firstly, in Green, a content provider (i.e., creator or
sharer) publishes his shared contents’ information to a
group of content maintainers self-organized in a security
overlay for providing the mechanisms of redundancy and
reliability. This allows a content requestor to obtain the
authentic information of his requested content by first
looking up in the overlay for the associated maintain-
ers, and then executing a proactive filtering process to
filter out the malicious information corrupted by mali-
cious and compromised maintainers.
Secondly, after the proactive information filtering, a
requestor resorts to the reputation-based information to
better identify the polluted contents. Here, the requestor
collects the past vote histories of the users who have
voted the requested content, so that he could utilize the
statistical correlation between his local vote history and
each of these collected vote histories to compute the rep-
utation score of any version of the requested content.
Thirdly, in order to enhance the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our basic reputation model, a requestor further
utilizes the social (friend-related) information. Specifi-
cally, the requestor uses his friends’ vote histories to ex-
tend the local vote history reliably. By considering these
extended vote histories, each requestor is able to per-
form the reputation computation more accurately; fur-
thermore, if many friends have already voted the re-
quested content, the requestor could use these associated
friends’ votes to efficiently estimate the reputation score.
Finally, according to the authentic content-based in-
formation as well as the social-based reputation infor-
mation, the requestor selects an authentic version of his
requested content for downloading. In Green, we allow a
requestor to verify the integrity of the requested content
while downloading and take prompt protection actions to
handle content pollution attacks. To reduce the verifica-
tion overhead, we devise a scalable probabilistic verifi-
cation scheme in which each requestor has the capability
of flexibly adjusting the false positive rate of integrity
verification according to the tradeoff between integrity
assurance and verification overhead.
Green is broadly applicable for both structured and un-
structured overlay applications. Moreover, it is able to
defend against various kinds of content pollution attacks
without incurring significant overhead on the participat-
ing users. We implemented a prototype system, and eval-
uate its performance on two massive-scale testbeds with
realistic network traces. The evaluation results illustrate
that Green can effectively and efficiently defend against
content pollution in various scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We spec-
ify the system model and terminology in section 2, fol-
lowed by a description of threat model in section 3. The
details of our Green system are elaborated in section 4.
We then analyze the defense capacity and maintenance
overhead of Green in section 5. Section 6 presents the
experimental design and discusses the evaluation results.
Finally, we give an overview of related work in section 7,
and conclude this paper in section 8.
2 System Model and Terminology
Current P2P overlay networks can generally be grouped
into two categories [21]: structured overlay networks,
e.g., Chord [31] and Pastry [30], that accurately build an
underlying topology to support rapid searching, and un-
structured overlay networks, e.g., Gnutella-like [1] net-
works, that merely impose loose structure on the topol-
ogy. In Green, for providing the mechanisms of redun-
dancy and reliability, we choose a structured P2P overlay
network as the underlying structure. Without loss of gen-
erality, we utilize Chord as the dedicated underlying P2P
overlay network, and we can also conveniently utilize an-
other structured overlay as an alternative. Nowadays, the
unstructured overlay applications are prevalent on the In-
ternet; to illustrate the broad applicability, we will further
describe how to deploy Green into unstructured overlays
in section 4.6.
Generally, a P2P content sharing system is composed
of contents and users. To elaborate our design clearly,
we introduce some related terminology about contents
and users in the following two sections, respectively.
2.1 Content-Related Terminology
We refer to a specific content (e.g., a document, video
or song) existing in the P2P content sharing system as a
title. A given title can generally have multiple different
versions, each of which is published by a group of users.
For instance, a large number of versions of the same
video could be produced by various rippers/encoders,
each of which may create a slightly different version.
Specifically, each version has an identifier, which is typ-
ically a hash value of the associated data (and meta-
data) of the version; therefore, modifications of data (and
metadata) no matter faithfully or maliciously could also
produce additional different versions. Finally, each ver-
sion may have many copies in the system due to the fact
that participating users could lookup and download vari-
ous versions of different titles from each other.
2.2 User-Related Terminology
In general, there is no centralized infrastructure in P2P
content sharing systems, and each participating user can
play one or several of the following three roles: provider,
requestor and maintainer.
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A provider publishes the information of his shared
copies into the P2P content sharing system, and informs
the associated maintainer(s) of building up or refreshing
the corresponding index structure. On the other hand, a
requestor who wants to obtain a copy of a specific title
can utilize the underlying overlay to route a query to-
wards the maintainer(s) associated with the requested ti-
tle, then these maintainer(s) should respond with a list of
corresponding index records. Once receiving the index
records, the requestor could filter out malicious records
and select one version to download from the associated
providers in parallel.
3 Threat Model
To better understand the characteristics of pollution at-
tack and design a more effective pollution defense, we
discuss two attack forms of content pollution: decoy in-
sertion [20] and identifier corruption [6].
3.1 Decoy Insertion
Decoy insertion is a common pollution mechanism uti-
lized by polluters in today’s P2P content sharing systems.
Here, the polluters target a specific title, and then man-
ufacture decoys (i.e., corrupted versions with the same
metadata but different identifiers) for the title in various
ways, e.g., for media contents, inserting advertisements,
cutting the duration, and replacing parts of the actual data
with undecodable white noise. Afterwards, the polluters
insert a massive number of decoys of the target title into
the system in order to reduce the availability of authentic
versions of the title severely.
In general, when a content requestor searches for a ti-
tle, the associated maintainer(s) should group the infor-
mation of the requested title’s available copies into dif-
ferent versions, and then return the grouped result back
to the requestor. Unable to distinguish between authen-
tic versions and polluted versions, the requestor would
select the version with the largest number of copies to
download; unfortunately, under collective decoy inser-
tion attacks, this selected version may be polluted.
3.2 Identifier Corruption
In a P2P content sharing system, each version is asso-
ciated with an identifier, which is typically generated by
applying a hash function to the data (and metadata) of the
version. The generated version identifier can be used by
content requestors to identify different versions of a spe-
cific title, and moreover, this identifier is also important
for maintainers to group the information of the requested
title’s available copies into different versions.
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Figure 1: System illustration. Note that, each user prac-
tically plays one or several of these roles simultaneously.
Due to the feature of hash function, it is usually as-
sumed that different data (and metadata) would generate
different identifiers. However, it is still possible to have
two actually different versions with the same identifer,
especially for the consideration of efficiency, when some
widely used P2P content sharing systems adopt weak
hash functions based only on a fraction of the data (and
metadata) of a version, e.g., the UUHash [4] function
employed by KaZaA [2]. So now, the polluters could an-
alyze the adopted hash function, and corrupt the fraction
of data (and metadata) that are not used without altering
the identifier of the corrupted version.
Under identifier corruption attacks, when a requestor
searches for a title, he can receive the grouped informa-
tion of the requested title’s versions from the maintain-
ers, where each version is associated with an identifier.
As usual, the requestor selects one version and down-
loads different blocks of the selected version from differ-
ent associated providers in parallel. However, if a down-
loaded block is a corrupted part from the changed ver-
sion, the entire downloaded version would be polluted.
4 Design of Green
In different P2P content sharing systems, each title may
be associated with a topic, a file or a keyword, depending
on different system designs. Without loss of generality,
we use “file” to replace “title” hereafter for clarity.
In Green, a provider publishes the information of his
shared files to a group of maintainers self-organized in
a structured overlay (section 4.1), so that a requestor
could obtain/filter the information of the requested file
from the associated maintainers (section 4.2). After-
wards, the requestor utilizes a social-based reputation
model to identify the polluted versions of his requested
3
Table 1: Design Notation
Symbol Meaning
F File
Vi The ith version of the requested file
V Ii The identifier of the version Vi
D The digest of a data block
DLi The digest list of the version Vi
U User
UI User identifier
P Provider
PI Provider identifier
PILi The provider identifier list of the version Vi
R Requestor
Mi The ith maintainer of a file
OI Voter identifier
OILi The voter identifier list of the version Vi
Oij The jth voter who has voted the version Vi
oij The vote on Vi given by the voter Oij
OHX The vote history of the user X
OMi The ith vote maintainer for a user
Fi The ith friend of the requestor
file (section 4.3), and then selects an authentic version
for downloading (section 4.4). While downloading, we
employ a realtime verification mechanism to help the re-
questor take prompt actions to handle content pollution
(section 4.5). Finally, we discuss how to deploy our de-
sign in unstructured overlays (section 4.6). In particular,
the abstract execution process of Green is illustrated in
Figure 1, and the notation that we use to simplify the de-
scription of our design can be found in Table 1.
4.1 Content Publication
As described in section 2, the underlying network struc-
ture is assumed to be the Chord overlay, so we utilize
SHA1 to assign each user and file an identifier. The user
identifier of a participant is chosen by hashing the par-
ticipant’s IP address, while a file identifier is produced
by hashing the filename. Recently, many users in P2P
content sharing systems reside behind network address
translators (NATs), hence a number of participating users
may share the same public IP address. Moreover, we
could not guarantee that each user’s IP address stays con-
stant in a dynamic P2P environment. That is, we are not
able to distinguish between different users solely by their
IP addresses. To solve the NAT and mobility problems,
we may adopt another kind of unique and constant iden-
tifiers (e.g., HIP-based identifiers [27]) to replace the IP-
based identifiers, which is not the focus of this paper.
Both the user identifiers and file identifiers are ordered
in an identifier circle. Specifically, the information of a
Table 2: The information of a specific file
Version Digest Provider ID Voter ID
ID List List List
1 V I1 DL1 PIL1 OIL1
2 V I2 DL2 PIL2 OIL2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i V Ii DLi PILi OILi
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n V In DLn PILn OILn
file F is assigned to the first user whose identifier is equal
to or follows the F ’s file identifier in the identifier circle.
This user is called the successor of file F , denoted by
successor(F ). Such structure tends to balance the load
on the system, since each user maintains the information
of roughly the same number of files; even if a user main-
tains the information of a popular file, several existing
techniques [15, 29] have provided the solutions of load
balancing.
In Green, a provider P , who wants to publish a spe-
cific file F , first divides the file F into b data blocks, and
then, he computes the digest of each block to construct
a digest list, i.e., {Di}bi=1. Here we could further utilize
the homomorphic hashing technique [18] to allow future
file requestors to perform order-independent verification
on these data blocks. Afterwards, according to F ’s file
identifier, the provider P maps the information of file
F (including the file identifier, digest list and his own
user identifier) onto the associated maintainer M , i.e.,
successor(F ) (step 1 in Figure 1). Once the maintainer
M has received such file information, he can additionally
take hash of the entire digest list as a version identifier of
file F . Moreover, in order to support the social-based
reputation model (described in section 4.3), each user
who has voted some versions of the file F should inform
the associated maintainer M (step 1’ in Figure 1), so that
the maintainer can know which users have voted the ver-
sions of file F , i.e., the associated voters. In particular,
since many providers may individually publish a number
of versions of file F , the information1 of F stored at the
maintainer M is shown in Table 2.
However, a maintainer may be offline and a malicious
or compromised maintainer has the capacity of fabricat-
ing/refusing/corrupting the file information maintained
by himself. Therefore, we map the information of a spe-
cific file F onto m maintainers {Mi}mi=1 to provide the
mechanisms of redundancy and reliability, i.e., each file
F corresponds to a unique group of maintainers.
Mi = successor(filename|i), 1 ≤ i ≤ m (1)
1In this paper, we omit the metadata-related information for clarity.
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Here, Mi denotes the ith maintainer of the file F ,
filename denotes the name of the file, and m denotes
the number of maintainers associated with the file. Due
to the essential feature of structured overlay, these m as-
sociated maintainers are distributed in the identifier circle
uniformly at random; therefore, we can design a filtering
scheme to exclude the malicious activities.
4.2 Proactive Filtering
Since the providers publish much information about their
shared files, we could collect such information from the
associated maintainers (step 2 in Figure 1), and then pro-
vide a proactive defense against the content pollution
(step 3 in Figure 1) as follows.
In Green, a requestor R, who wants to acquire a spe-
cific file F , issues a query (i.e., F ’s file identifier) to-
wards the m associated maintainers in the system ac-
cording to the expression 1. Each of these maintainers
should maintain the information of at least one version of
the requested file F . Then, these m maintainers respond
with the corresponding information of the requested file
F (see Table 2). On harvesting these responses, the re-
questor R mixes them and generates a list L consisting
of 〈V I, PI〉 pairs (do not remove duplicate pairs), where
the V I and PI denote the version and provider identi-
fiers associated with the requested file F , respectively.
Based on the generated list L, we design a filtering
scheme to exclude the malicious activities. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the total percentage of ma-
licious and compromised users is β. Furthermore, as
specified in section 4.1, each file corresponds to a group
of m maintainers. Due to the features of hash-based
maintainer assignment (see expression 1), these main-
tainers associated with the same file are distributed uni-
formly at random. Therefore, the probability that x out
of m maintainers in a group are malicious is
Pr(m,x) =
(
m
x
)
× βx × (1− β)m−x (2)
Thus, the probability that less than half of these m main-
tainers are malicious is
Pr(m, 0, ⌊m− 1
2
⌋) =
⌊m−1
2
⌋∑
x=0
Pr(m,x) (3)
The expression 3 implies that though the malicious
and compromised maintainers may collectively cre-
ate/delete/modify their maintained 〈V I, PI〉 pairs, each
〈V I, PI〉 pair existing in the generated list L for no less
than ⌈m+12 ⌉ (i.e., m − ⌊m−12 ⌋) times is authentic with
the probability of Pr(m, 0, ⌊m−12 ⌋). In practice, the sys-
tem designer would need to estimate the worst network
environment that the system should sustain in order to
determine the corresponding βworst. Then, according to
the βworst and the expected communication overhead,
the system designer could further tune the parameter m
to guarantee that Pr(m, 0, ⌊m−12 ⌋) is large enough even
in the worst environment. For instance, if βworst = 0.2
and m = 5, the Pr(m, 0, ⌊m−12 ⌋) will be 94.2%, which
is sufficient for common systems. In other words, by ap-
plying the suitable system parameters, the requestor R
can safely employ a proactive filtering mechanism here
by filtering the aforementioned list L through removing
the 〈V I, PI〉 pairs with less than ⌈m+12 ⌉ times.
In the same way, the requestor R could filter out the
malicious 〈V I,OI〉 pairs, where the V I and OI denote
the version and voter identifiers associated with the re-
quested file F , respectively. Moreover, the malicious
maintainers may choose to corrupt a version identifier
V Ii or a digest list DLi of the file, but this generally
could not take effect since the requestor is able to de-
tect such corruption by simply hashing the digest list and
then comparing the result with the corresponding version
identifier. Certainly, these malicious and compromised
maintainers may choose to corrupt a version identifier
V Ii and the corresponding digest list DLi simultane-
ously; if so, the requestor could also utilize the above
proactive filtering mechanism to filter out the corrupted
information. After all the previous kinds of filtering, the
requestor excludes these filtered information, and groups
the remainder to locally reconstruct the information of
the requested file F (see Table 2).
4.3 Social-Based Reputation Model
Reputation model is a common technique to address the
problem of content pollution. In this section, we first de-
sign a basic reputation model, and then we use the social
information to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency.
4.3.1 Basic Reputation Model
Based on the proactive filtering mechanism, the re-
questor R can obtain the authentic information of the
requested file F by filtering out the malicious activities
performed by malicious and compromised maintainers.
However, polluters could choose to simply inject pol-
luted versions of the file F without corrupting the main-
tained information. Due to the lack of authenticity verifi-
cation, the requestorR generally cannot know which ver-
sions have been polluted. Here, we resort to the general
reputation-based information to further help requestors
identify the polluted versions.
Vote Gathering (step 4 in Figure 1). The requestorR
first extracts each version Vi’s associated voter identifier
list OILi from the reconstructed information of file F
(see Table 2). Then, the requestor traverses OILi, and
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contacts each voter Oij indicated by OILi to gain the
voter’s past vote historyOHij . Once receiving these vote
histories, the requestor can easily obtain each voter Oij ’s
vote oij on the version Vi. The vote may be either −1, if
the voter considers the version polluted, or 1, otherwise.
In the above simple vote gathering mechanism, vot-
ers are required to remain online, otherwise their votes
would be lost. To solve this problem, besides the locally
maintained vote history, we employ a redundancy mech-
anism (similar to the expression 1) to map each user U ’s
vote history onto a group of m vote maintainers (steps 1”
and 1”’ in Figure 1).
OMi = successor(UI|i), 1 ≤ i ≤ m (4)
Here, OMi denotes the ith vote maintainer for the user
U , UI denotes the identifier of the user, and m denotes
the number of vote maintainers for the user. Now, no
matter the voter Oij is online or offline, the requestor R
has the capacity of obtainingOij ’s past vote history from
the associated vote maintainers, and then filtering out the
malicious activities performed by malicious and compro-
mised vote maintainers as described in section 4.2. Note
that, when the number of a version’s associated voters is
too large, the requestor should choose a set of randomly-
selected voters to perform the vote gathering in order to
control the communication overhead.
Reputation Computation (step 5 in Figure 1). With
the vote gathering mechanism, the requestor R could ob-
tain each associated voter Oij ’s vote oij on the version
Vi. Based on these votes, the requestor is able to com-
pute the reputation score of Vi. The simplest way is to
execute the unweighted averaging on these votes; how-
ever, it cannot distinguish between different voters, e.g.,
both like-minded voters and malicious voters are treated
equally. Instead, in our design, we compute a Credence-
style [32] weight coefficient θ for each vote and execute
the weighted averaging to compute the reputation score.
The computation of weight coefficient is described as
follows:
θ(R,Oij) =


p−ab√
a(1−a)b(1−b)
if | p−ab√
a(1−a)b(1−b)
| ≥ 0.5
0 if | p−ab√
a(1−a)b(1−b)
| < 0.5
(5)
Here, given the set of versions on which both R and Oij
have voted, a and b are the fraction where R and Oij
voted positively, respectively, and similarly p is the frac-
tion where both voted positively. Several abnormal cases
that arise in practice are discussed in [32].
The weight coefficient θ(R,Oij) expresses the statis-
tical correlation between the two users’ vote histories,
and captures whether they tend to vote identically (i.e.,
θ(R,Oij) ≥ 0.5), inversely (i.e., θ(R,Oij) ≤ −0.5) or un-
correlatedly (i.e., |θ(R,Oij)| < 0.5). Based on the weight
coefficient, the requestor performs the weighted averag-
ing to compute the reputation score of each version Vi.
Rep(Vi) =
∑|OILi|
j=1
(
oij × θ(R,Oij)
)
∑|OILi|
j=1 |θ(R,Oij)|
∈ [−1, 1] (6)
Here, |OILi| denotes the size of the associated voter
identifier list of Vi; moreover, if
∑|OILi|
j=1 |θ(R,Oij)| = 0,
then Rep(Vi) = 0. This weighted averaging scheme
gives more weight to votes from like-minded voters, and
it can be used to assist requestors in better identifying
polluted versions.
4.3.2 Social-Based Enhancement
Currently, many P2P systems have already merged the
social information, e.g., the friend links, for some pur-
poses. These friend links are very different from the
overlay links, and they could be created in various ways.
For instance, the friends may be these real-world ac-
quaintances, or many more. A user and his friends gen-
erally share a similar interest and give similar votes on
a specific version; moreover, the friends are much more
trustworthy than other common users. By exploiting the
information of friends, we can provide two kinds of en-
hancement for the above basic reputation model: vote
history extension and efficiency improvement.
Vote History Extension. In a P2P content sharing
system, a requestor may have only a few local vote his-
tory. This would make the requestor cannot accurately
compute the correlation between each associated voter
and himself, thus influencing the performance of our rep-
utation model. To extend the local vote history, the re-
questor could additionally consider his friends’ vote his-
tories before performing the reputation computation.
We assume that the requestorR with local vote history
OHR has f friends in the system, denoted by {Fi}fi=1;
moreover, each friend Fi has the vote history OHFi . In
our vote history extension scheme, the requestor first col-
lects his friends’ vote histories from the associated vote
maintainers, by filtering out the malicious activities per-
formed by malicious and compromised vote maintainers.
Then, the requestor adopts an attenuation coefficient γ to
weigh his friends’ vote histories. Finally, the requestor
performs a simple nonzero averaging on these friends’
vote histories as well as his local vote history to compute
the extended vote history OH ′R.
OH ′R = avg
(
OHR, OHF1 × γ, · · · , OHFf × γ
)
= avg
(
OHR, {OHFi × γ}fi=1
) (7)
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Here, each vote history is treated as a vector, and the
avg is defined to be a function of computing, in turn,
the averages of nonzero values at each position in these
vectors.
To illustrate the computation process intuitively, we
give an example. Suppose a requestor R with local vote
history OHR = {1,−1, 0, 0,−1, 0} has two friends F1
and F2 in the system. So, he is able to collect the two
friends’ vote histories OHF1 and OHF2 from the associ-
ated vote maintainers.
OHF1 = {0, 0, 1, 0,−1,−1}
OHF2 = {1, 0, 1, 0,−1, 0}
In practice, the vote history can be stored and transmitted
in a more compact way. If the attenuation coefficient γ
is set to 0.9, then the final extended vote history OH ′R is
OH ′R = { 1+1×0.91+0.9 ,−11 , 1×0.9+1×0.90.9+0.9 , 0,
(−1)+(−1)×0.9+(−1)×0.9
1+0.9+0.9 ,
(−1)×0.9
0.9 }
= {1,−1, 1,0,−1,−1}
Due to the fact that the friends are generally trustwor-
thy, the requestor could apply the vote history extension
to enrich his vote history reliably; therefore, he is able
to perform the reputation computation more accurately.
Note that, if a requestor R has many malicious friends,
the extended vote history may be polluted; here, some
existing mechanisms, e.g., SybilGuard [36] and Sybil-
Limit [35], could be used to improve the trustworthiness
of friends. Moreover, if the requestor does not have any
friends in the system, our social-based reputation model
falls back to the basic form. In some sense, the requestor
should “pay the price” for having no friends or having
many malicious friends.
Interestingly, our proposed vote history extension
scheme can not only improve the accuracy of reputation
computation, but also solve the “cold start” problem, i.e.,
a newly incoming user (i.e., newcomer) without any vote
history cannot benefit from the reputation model. To
address the “cold start” problem, once joining the sys-
tem, the newcomer first builds up the friend links. Then,
he collects his friends’ vote histories to compute the ex-
tended vote history as described above. Specifically, this
extended vote history could be treated as the newcomer’s
initial local vote history, so that he could perform the rep-
utation model normally.
Efficiency Improvement. From the previous descrip-
tion of vote history extension, each time a requestor exe-
cutes the reputation computation, he should collect the
vote histories from his friends’ associated vote main-
tainers, which is somewhat expensive. In Green, each
user periodically collects his friends’ vote histories from
these associated vote maintainers, and meanwhile, each
user maintains a friend-vote database to store the lat-
est collected vote histories (step 1”” in Figure 1). With
this kind of database, the requestor is able to retrieve his
friends’ vote histories locally.
Secondly, due to the fact that a user and his friends
generally have the similar interest, they may give the
similar votes on a specific version. If many friends of
a requestor have already voted a version, the requestor
does not need to compute the reputation score of the
version again; as an alternative, he could utilize these
friends’ votes to efficiently estimate the reputation score.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the re-
questor wants to obtain the reputation score of a specific
version Vi, and moreover he has f friends, among which
there are f ′ friends {Fj}f
′
j=1 who have already given the
votes {oij}f
′
j=1 on the version Vi. Note that, such in-
formation can be retrieved from the locally maintained
friend-vote database. Specifically, if only a few friends
have voted the version (i.e., f ′ is small), the associated
votes may be biased, so now we have to return back to
use the normal social-based reputation model described
before; otherwise, if a sufficient number (f ′ ≥ 4 in
our design) of friends have voted the version, we utilize
the associated votes to efficiently estimate the reputation
score Rep′(Vi) of the version Vi.
Rep′(Vi) =
∑f ′
j=1 oij
f ′
× γ (8)
Here, the parameter γ denotes the attenuation coefficient.
If |Rep′(Vi)| ≥ 0.5, we consider that these friends voted
the version Vi identically, so the Rep′(Vi) can be treated
as the final reputation score Rep(Vi) of the version Vi;
otherwise, there are significant differences among these
f ′ associated friends, so we again return back to use the
normal social-based reputation model described before.
With low probability, a malicious user may masquer-
ade as genuine user to become the requestor’s friend,
and a friend may also be compromised. To address this
“malicious friend” problem, before performing the ef-
ficient reputation estimation, the requestor should first
compute the correlation coefficient θ between each asso-
ciated friend and himself, as specified in expression 5.
If θ < 0.5, the friend may be malicious or uncorre-
lated [32], so we choose not to take this friend’s vote
into account. Due to the periodically updated friend-vote
database, these correlation coefficients could be com-
puted periodically instead of repeatedly.
In summary, we use the social (friend-related) infor-
mation a) to provide a vote history extension mechanism
to enhance the effectiveness of basic reputation model
even for a system newcomer, and b) to further enhance
the efficiency of both the vote history collection and rep-
utation computation.
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4.4 Version Selection
After the proactive filtering (section 4.2) and social-
based reputation computation (section 4.3), the requestor
has obtained two kinds of information about each version
Vi of his requested file: the authentic provider identifier
list PILi and the reputation score Rep(Vi). Based on
such information, the requestor is able to select a version
for downloading (step 6 in Figure 1).
Since the size of the associated provider identifier list
generally reflects the availability of a specific version, in
many cases, the requestor R selects the version with the
largest provider identifier list. However, the analytical
model presented in [13] characterized the impact of var-
ious selection strategies, and implied that the “largest”
strategy is vulnerable to the pollution attack as well as
the Denial-of-Service attack. As an alternative, in Green,
the requestor R’s choice is biased towards versions with
more providers. Furthermore, the reputation score of a
version indicates the authenticity of the version, so the
probability of selecting a version should also be propor-
tional to the associated reputation score. Considering the
above factors, we get the following expression:
Pr(Vi) =
|PILi| × ˜Rep(Vi)∑n
j=1
(
|PILj| × ˜Rep(Vj)) , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(9)
Here, Pr(Vi) denotes the probability of selecting the ver-
sion Vi for downloading, |PILi| denotes the size of the
provider identifier list of Vi, and n denotes the number
of versions associated with the requested file. Specifi-
cally, as the originalRep(Vi) ∈ [−1, 1], we make a linear
mapping and let ˜Rep(Vi) = Rep(Vi) + 1 to ensure each
Pr(Vi) ≥ 0. Note that, when the denominator of the
expression is 0, the requestor has to perform an ad hoc
version selection; however, this might happen only when
all versions’ original reputation scores are −1, which in-
dicates that there is no authentic version of the requested
file existing in the system.
4.5 Downloading with Realtime Verifica-
tion
The requestor R starts downloading the data blocks of
the selected version from these associated providers in
parallel. Once the requestor receives a data block, he first
locally computes a digest D by hashing the received data
block, and then, matches D against the digest existing
in the corresponding digest list of the requested F ’s file
information (reconstructed based on the proactive filter-
ing as described in section 4.2). If they are matched, the
received data block is accepted, otherwise the block is
dropped. These operations make the requestor have the
capacity of verifying the integrity of the selected version
while downloading (step 7 in Figure 1).
In common as described above, aiming at verifying the
data integrity, the requestor R verifies all the received
data blocks while downloading. To reduce the verifi-
cation overhead, we propose a probabilistic verification
scheme which verifies randomly selected blocks instead
of all blocks.
In this scheme, the requestor R assumes that a pol-
luter should tamper with at least r blocks of all b blocks,
and moreover, less than r polluted blocks could be suc-
cessfully recovered by the error-correcting code (ECC)
technique. Based on this assumption, the requestor
R would need to determine the expected false positive
rate (EFPR) of the probabilistic verification according to
the tradeoff between integrity assurance and verification
overhead. That is,
FPR =


(b−rv )
(bv)
= (b−r)!×(b−v)!(b−r−v)!×b! if r + v ≤ b
0 if r + v > b
≤ EFPR
(10)
Here, FPR and EFPR denote the actual and expected
false positive rate, respectively; moreover, b denotes the
total number of data blocks, v denotes the number of ver-
ified data blocks, and r denotes the lower bound of the
number of polluted data blocks. Now, the requestor R
can randomly verify the minimal number of data blocks,
denoted by vmin, that satisfies the above expression 10,
in order to reduce the verification overhead.
Finally, after the downloading and verification, the
requestor builds the complete version from these data
blocks. If the built version is authentic, the requestor
gives/publishes a positive vote on the version, and then
shares the downloaded version; otherwise, if the ver-
sion is unfortunately found to be polluted, the requestor
should delete it, give/publish a negative vote, and then re-
peat from the step of version selection (section 4.4) until
he receives the authentic version or the authentic version
is found to be non-existent in the system.
4.6 Deployment in Unstructured Overlay
In the previous sections, we focus on the design of Green
in structured overlay systems; to illustrate the broad ap-
plicability, we further describe how to deploy Green in
unstructured overlay systems.
Generally, a unstructured overlay system is composed
of users joining the overlay with some loose rules. To de-
ploy our design, we introduce a two-tier structure into the
unstructured overlay: a subset of users (i.e., ultra-users)
construct a structured mesh, while the other users (i.e.,
leaf-users) connect to the ultra-user tier for participating
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into the overlay system. Specifically, we adopt the elec-
tion algorithm in [22] to select the ultra-users, and then
utilize our proposed design to construct the structured
mesh among ultra-users, so that the unstructured over-
lay systems could also benefit from our defense mecha-
nisms against content pollution. In practice, many mod-
ern unstructured P2P overlay systems have already im-
plemented some similar two-tier structures, so that the
deployment of Green in unstructured overlay systems
will not make many modifications to their original net-
work structures. Consequently, Green is broadly appli-
cable, and it is able to work for both structured and un-
structured overlays.
5 System Analysis
A well-designed pollution-free P2P content sharing sys-
tem should seek to optimize its defense capacity and
maintenance overhead under the two kinds of common
content pollution attacks discussed in section 3.
5.1 Defense Capacity
Decoy Insertion. Under a decoy insertion attack, the
polluters inject a massive number of corrupted versions
(with the same metadata but different identifiers) for a
target file, in order to reduce the availability of authentic
versions of the file. In Green, we propose a social-based
reputation model to defend against such decoy insertion.
In a P2P content sharing system, the genuine users
give positive votes on the authentic versions, and neg-
ative votes on the polluted versions; on the contrary, in
order to spread the polluted versions, the polluters give
the opposite votes to value the polluted versions instead
of authentic versions. However, this kind of malicious
voting operations will notably impact the correlation be-
tween polluters and genuine users (see expression 5), and
make genuine users give negative weights (θ < 0) to
the votes from polluters, i.e., a negative vote from pol-
luters actually values a version (see expression 6). Even
if the polluters apply a tricky voting strategy by giving
correct votes sometimes, this will also not influence the
system performance significantly because the genuine
users would mark the votes from these tricky polluters
as uncorrelated and then directly drop them. Moreover,
each requestor considers his friends’ votes to extend the
vote history reliably (see expression 7), so that the re-
questor could perform the reputation computation more
accurately. To enhance the efficiency, if many friends of
a requestor have voted a specific version, the requestor
further utilizes his friends’ votes to quickly estimate the
reputation score of the version (see expression 8).
Consequently, though polluters inject many corrupted
versions of a target file into the system and perform the
malicious voting, the genuine users are still able to select
the authentic versions for downloading effectively and
efficiently.
Identifier Corruption. To launch an identifier corrup-
tion attack, the polluters should first analyze the prop-
erties of the hash function used by a P2P content shar-
ing system. Then, they accurately corrupt a fraction of
data (e.g., the data that are not used) without changing
the identifier of the corrupted version. Unfortunately, the
reputation model cannot identify such attacks due to the
unchanged version identifier. In our design, we propose
a block-based verification mechanism to defend against
the identifier corruption.
In Green, a maintainer manages many digest lists, each
of which is associated with a maintained version. A
requestor could obtain the digest lists, and then utilize
them to verify the integrity of data blocks while down-
loading (see section 4.5). Due to the fact that each
data block is used to generate the digest list and each
block digest is verified, it is very difficult for polluters
to perform the identifier corruption attack. Furthermore,
we design a probabilistic verification mechanism to re-
duce the verification overhead. Here, each requestor
randomly verifies a number of data blocks of the se-
lected version (see expression 10), so that the polluters
cannot always launch successful identifier corruption at-
tacks by corrupting some fixed data blocks. Indeed, the
probabilistic verification may impact our defense capac-
ity against identifier corruption. There is a tradeoff be-
tween integrity assurance and verification overhead. If a
requestor wants to completely defeat the identifier cor-
ruption, he should verify all the downloaded data blocks.
5.2 Maintenance Overhead
To support the running of Green, a participating user
plays two roles: file information maintainer and vote
maintainer; and meanwhile, each user concretely main-
tains three information sets: a set of file information, a set
of common users’ vote histories, and a set of his friends’
vote histories. Specifically, in Green, the maintained in-
formation is distributed averagely, and it will not incur
much maintenance overhead on the participating users.
The reason is twofold.
Firstly, since we use the hash function to perform the
assignment of file information maintainers, each user
maintains the information of roughly the same number of
files, thus achieving a good load balancing. As shown in
Table 2, the information of a file is composed of a num-
ber of 〈V Ii, DLi, P ILi, OILi〉 quaternions. In each
quaternion, the version identifier V Ii is a hash value; the
digest list DLi is a list of data block digests, here the
system designer could control the size of DLi through
bounding the number of divided data blocks of a file;
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moreover, both PILi and OILi merely store the asso-
ciated provider identifiers and voter identifiers, respec-
tively, which will not aggravate a user’s maintenance bur-
den significantly. In addition, even if a user maintains the
information of a popular file (with a large number of ver-
sions, providers and voters), several techniques [15, 29]
could be employed here for load balancing.
Secondly, due to the hash-based vote maintainer as-
signment and the redundancy mechanism, each user
maintains roughly m common users’ vote histories on
average; furthermore, each user maintains a friend-vote
database consisting of his friends’ vote histories. Gener-
ally, maintaining these vote histories will also not aggra-
vate the burden of a user significantly.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we first describe the experimental setup,
and then we present the key performance metric. Finally,
we comparably evaluate the performance of Green.
6.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance, we developed a prototype
system implementing all our proposed security mech-
anisms with approximately 5040 lines of Java code.
Specifically, all the experiments are run on an Open-
Power720 with four-way dual-core POWER5 CPUs and
16GB RAM running SLES 9.1.
Network Model: We use two realistic massive-scale
network traces [25], YouTube (1,157,827 users and
4,945,382 friend links, Jan 2007) and Flickr (1,846,198
users and 22,613,981 friend links, Jan 2007), to gener-
ate the social/friend networks. Specifically, since these
traces do not indicate which users are genuine or mali-
cious, we have to perform an appropriate processing on
the two generated social networks.
According to the small-world property of online social
networks [5, 25], we generate 50 genuine user groups for
each generated social network as follows. We first ran-
domly select 50 bootstrapping users as the seeds of these
genuine user groups, and then use the breadth-first search
algorithm to extend these genuine user groups to guaran-
tee that each group contains a different number of unique
users (Zipf distribution with its parameter α = 1). Note
that, if we cannot generate a required number of genuine
users from a bootstrapping user, we randomly select an-
other bootstrapping user to replace this one. Except these
users contained by genuine user groups, the other users
are polluters.
We choose Chord [31] as the underlying P2P overlay
of Green, and all the users participate in the Chord over-
lay to construct a structured overlay network, so that we
could use it to assign/lookup the file information main-
tainers, the vote maintainers, etc.
Content Model: The previous study in [20] reported
the existence of a large number of polluted versions for a
single file. In our experiments, there are 10, 000 unique
files, each of which has 100 different versions. Since we
do not model the corruption activities performed by ma-
licious maintainers, the information of a file is stored at
only one information maintainer, and similarly the vote
history of a user is also stored at one vote maintainer.
Moreover, each version is associated with a number of
providers which vary over time.
At the start of our experiments, each genuine user
shares 20 authentic versions, and each polluter shares
400 and 50 polluted versions when performing decoy in-
sertion and identifier corruption, respectively; this mod-
els a highly malicious environment. Here, the versions
shared by a user are determined by first selecting a cer-
tain file and then its version. Specifically, both selections
follow Zipf distribution with α = 0.8 [20].
Execution Model: Different queries are initiated at
uniformly distributed users, and the attenuation coeffi-
cient γ is set to 0.9. Specifically, an experiment is com-
posed of 50 experimental cycles, and each experimental
cycle is divided into 5, 000, 000 query cycles. In each
query cycle, the selection of a specific version to down-
load is done by first selecting a file according to Zipf
distribution with α = 0.8, and then choosing a version
based on our proposed schemes. After each experimental
cycle, the number of authentic downloads is computed.
For a genuine user, he gives a vote on the downloaded
version with a probability of Po. Here, we add noise
to model users’ mistakes through making genuine users
vote correctly with only 90% probability. Further, if a
downloaded version is polluted, the genuine user deletes
this version with a probability of Pd. On the other hand,
for a polluter, he always gives a malicious (i.e., oppo-
site) vote on the downloaded version, and then shares it.
In addition, each user collects his friends’ vote histories
from the associated vote maintainers and updates the lo-
cal friend-vote database once per 100, 000 query cycles.
6.2 Performance Metric
In our experiments, we characterize the system perfor-
mance using the fraction of authentic downloads. It is
defined as the fraction of downloads that the genuine
users acquire authentic versions during one experimen-
tal cycle.
6.3 Evaluation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Green
under decoy insertion and identifier corruption, by con-
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Figure 2: Evaluation results under the decoy insertion attack
Table 3: Experimental Notation
Symbol Meaning
β The total fraction of polluters
Po The probability that a genuine user
gives a vote on the downloaded version
Pd The probability that a genuine user
deletes the downloaded polluted version
FPR The false positive rate of probabilistic
verification
sidering four parameters: β, Po, Pd and FPR (see Ta-
ble 3). Their default values are 0.2, 0.9, 0.9 and 0.133,
respectively. Specifically, in each experiment, we may
vary only one parameter and leave the others default.
6.3.1 Under Decoy Insertion Attack
Comparison. Using two realistic traces, we evaluate the
performance of Green as compared to four other systems
with the default parameters.
• Baseline: The probability of selecting a version
Vi to download is proportional to |PILi| (i.e., the
number of Vi’s associated providers).
• Credence: An ingenious and representative pollu-
tion defense system deployed on live networks [32].
• Social-based Credence: The Credence system with
our social-based enhancement.
• Non-social Green: The Green system without our
social-based enhancement.
As shown in Figures 2a and 2b, Green outperforms
all other systems with only 3% of all the downloaded
versions being polluted; moreover, the “Baseline” can-
not work well. Specifically, two systems with social-
based enhancement, i.e., Green and “Social-based Cre-
dence”, converge faster than “Non-social Green” and
“Credence”. This is because that, though each user has
only a small number of vote history at the startup, the
user in social-based systems could additionally consider
his friends’ vote histories to help judging the version au-
thenticity more accurately.
Furthermore, we could find that the two systems with
social-based enhancement, i.e., Green and “social-based
Credence”, in the network with Flickr trace converge a
little faster than in the network with YouTube trace. The
reason is that each user in Flickr has 12.25 friend links
on average which is larger that 4.27 in YouTube. This
phenomenon also implies that, in order to achieve a good
performance, a user in Green actually does not need too
many friends.
Since Green always outperforms the four other sys-
tems in the following experiments and it performs simi-
larly in the two networks with YouTube and Flickr traces,
respectively, we hereafter choose to merely present
the experimental results of Green in the network with
YouTube trace for saving the space.
Impact of Polluters. In this experiment, we investi-
gate the influence incurred by different fractions of pol-
luters (β). As shown in Figure 2c, the performance of
Green decreases slightly with the growth of the fraction
of polluters, and Green can work well even in a highly
malicious environment with 40% of users being pol-
luters. Here, the slight performance decrease is mostly
due to the fact that, with the increase of polluters, both
the fraction of genuine users’ malicious friends and the
number of polluted versions increase in the system. Also,
the result implies that if a user could ensure most of his
friends being genuine, he is able to select an authentic
version to download with very high probability; this ac-
tually provides a strong incentive for genuine users to
maintain the trustworthiness of their friends.
Impact of Voting. Figure 2d shows that Green can
work well with various different voting probabilities
(Po); moveover, even if genuine users are very inactive to
vote the downloaded versions (Po = 0.2), Green can still
work well. This benefits from our vote history extension
scheme which could extend a user’s vote history by con-
sidering his friends’ vote histories. Specifically, in cur-
rent P2P content sharing systems, only a few users may
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Figure 3: Evaluation results under the identifier corruption attack
vote the downloaded versions [20], so the above experi-
mental result further indicates that Green can indeed be
deployed in practice. Note that, if Po = 0, Green would
fall back to a Baseline-like system and any existing rep-
utation systems cannot work, under decoy insertion.
Impact of Deleting. We further evaluate the system
performance with different deleting probabilities (Pd).
In Green, the deleting strategy impacts the number of a
polluted version’s associated providers, thus influencing
the probability of selecting this version to download in
the future (see expression 9). Hence, we would expect
that the system performance increases with the growth
of deleting probability.
Interestingly, different deleting probabilities have,
however, no significant impact on the performance of
Green. Our analysis takes three factors into considera-
tion. Firstly, a user may activate his own deleting module
only after he has already downloaded a polluted version.
Secondly, Green is able to identify most of the polluted
versions, and therefore, a genuine user downloads pol-
luted versions with very low probability. Thirdly, even
if a genuine user has downloaded a polluted version and
does not delete it, he may give a negative vote on this
version; thus, other genuine users could identify this pol-
luted version based on the negative vote. As a result,
no matter which deleting strategy is adopted by these
genuine users, Green could always work well under de-
coy insertion attacks. Specifically, Green also keeps this
property under identifier corruption attacks. Due to the
space limit, we omit the two corresponding figures.
6.3.2 Under Identifier Corruption Attack
Comparison. In this experiment, we comparably eval-
uate the performance of Green in the network with
YouTube trace. Figure 3a illustrates that Green out-
performs all other four systems. Moreover, the three
systems, i.e., “Baseline”, “Credence” and “Social-based
Credence”, which do not perform verification while
downloading cannot defend against identifier corrup-
tion effectively; this validates the effectiveness of our
proposed realtime verification mechanism. In addition,
the experimental result also indicates that the effect of
social-based enhancement is limited under the identifier
corruption attack.
Due to the space limit and the similar performance in
both networks with the YouTube and Flickr traces, re-
spectively, we omit to present the system performance
using Flickr trace, and hereafter choose to merely present
the experimental results of Green in the network with
YouTube trace.
Impact of Polluters. We vary the fraction of polluters
(β), and investigate the influence incurred by polluters.
Figure 3b shows that Green can defeat identifier corrup-
tion even in a highly malicious environment with 40% of
users being polluters. In real-world P2P systems, some
polluters may perform Sybil [12] attacks to create a large
number of virtual malicious users, and the above exper-
imental result implies that Green could also work well
under the Sybil attack. Of course, we are able to incor-
porate Green with some other Sybil defenses, e.g., Sybil-
Guard [36] and SybilLimit [35], to achieve a better sys-
tem performance.
Impact of Voting. As shown in Figure 3c, we eval-
uate the system performance with the voting probability
(Po) varying in steps of 0.2. The experimental result il-
lustrates that the voting probability has little effect on the
system performance, i.e., our system always works well
no matter which voting strategy the genuine users adopt.
The reason of this phenomenon is that Green’s defense
capacity against identifier corruption is mostly provided
by the realtime verification mechanism which does not
utilize the vote history. This experimental result further
validates that our proposed mechanism is applicable in
real-world P2P systems where only a few users may give
votes on the downloaded versions.
Impact of False Positive Rate. In Green, each user
is able to flexibly adjust the false positive rate (FPR)
of probabilistic verification. The experimental result in
Figure 3d shows that the false positive rate of probabilis-
tic verification impacts our defense capacity against the
identifier corruption attack. There is a tradeoff between
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integrity assurance and verification overhead. The more
data blocks a user verifies, the better defense capacity
he can gain; whereas the pattern is reversed. This result
validates our analysis in section 5.1.
7 Related Work
7.1 Pollution Defenses
So far, many reputation models have been proposed to
address the problem of content pollution in P2P content
sharing systems. In general, these reputation models can
be grouped into three main categories: peer-based mod-
els, object-based models and hybrid models.
In peer-based reputation models, e.g., EigenTrust [17],
PeerTrust [33] and Scrubber [9], to reflect the level of
honesty, each participating user is assigned a reputation
score by considering his past behaviors in pairwise trans-
actions. According to the reputation score, genuine users
could collectively identify content polluters, and then
isolate these polluters from the system. However, the
studies in [13, 32] evaluated the potential impact of peer-
based reputation models, and implied that these models
are insufficient to defend against the pollution attack.
Among the object-based reputation models, Cre-
dence [32] is the typical representative of them. In Cre-
dence, genuine users determine the object authenticity
through secure tabulation and management of endorse-
ments from other users. This model utilizes the statistical
correlation to measure the reliability of users’ past votes,
and designs a decentralized flow-based trust computa-
tion to discover trustworthy users. However, a newcomer
without vote history hardly has any capacity of distin-
guishing between authentic objects and polluted objects.
Aiming at combining the benefits of both peer-based
and object-based models, several hybrid reputation mod-
els, e.g., XRep [11], X2Rep [10] and extended Scrub-
ber [8], have been further presented. Nevertheless, due
to the fact that most of the participating users in P2P con-
tent sharing systems are rational in seeking to maximize
their individual utilities, the reputation models are penal-
ized by the lack of reliable user cooperation.
Currently, without resorting to reputation models, sev-
eral other pollution defenses have been proposed. Micro-
payment techniques, e.g., MojoNation [3] and PPay [34],
can be utilized to counter the pollution attack by impos-
ing a cost on content polluters — to inject polluted con-
tent into the system they should first commit a certain
amount of resources. Furthermore, Habib et al. in [16]
developed an integrated security framework to verify
content integrity in P2P media streaming. This frame-
work could provide high assurance of data integrity with
low computation and communication overheads; how-
ever, it requires centralized supplying peers. In [23],
Michalakis et al. presented a “Repeat and Compare”
system to ensure content integrity by utilizing the P2P
substrate to repeat content generation on other peers and
compare the results to detect content pollution. This sys-
tem focuses on the replication of computations instead
of data replication and comparison, and its application
field is generally the P2P content distribution networks.
Recently, Chen et al. in [7] proposed a new pollution de-
fense based on the notion that the content providers are
the only sources to accurately distinguish polluted con-
tents and verify the integrity of the requested contents;
however, it cannot defeat decoy insertion effectively.
7.2 Social Networking
Social networking sites such as YouTube, Facebook,
MySpace, Orkut and Flickr are experiencing explosive
growth, both in terms of involved communities and over-
all participating users. The social networking technique
has significantly impacted how Internet users make use
of the today’s Internet. So far, several proposals have
been made to improve existing distributed systems by ex-
ploiting the inherent properties of social networks.
PGP [37] is one of the early social networking appli-
cations, in which the participants create a “web of trust”
to authenticate public keys based on their acquaintances’
opinions in a fully self-organized manner. This “web of
trust” model utilized the friend-of-friend trust structure,
and then Garriss et al. in [14] adopted the similar struc-
ture to develop the “Reliable Email (RE:)”, an automated
whitelisting-based email acceptance system, to mitigate
email spam. RE: exploits social relationships among
email correspondents, and moreover, it does not incur
false positives among socially connected users. In [24],
Mislove et al. tried to combine the information contained
in both hyperlinks and social links, so they merged the
social networking technique into the Web search engine
to optimize the ranking results by considering various in-
terests of different users.
To defend against Sybil attacks [12], two promising
decentralized social-based protocols, SybilGuard [36]
and SybilLimit [35], have been proposed. They utilize
the social networks among user identities based on the
fact that Sybil users could create many identities but few
trust relationships; finally, the two protocols have the ca-
pacity of allowing only very limited Sybil users to be
accepted even in a large-scale network. Furthermore
in [26], based on the similar fact that it is difficult for
a user to create arbitrarily many trust relationships, the
Ostra system explored the use of existing social links
to impose a cost on the information senders, thus pre-
venting the adversary from sending excessive unwanted
communication. Recently, Ramachandran and Feamster
in [28] proposed a framework called Authenticatr to es-
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tablish authenticated out-of-brand communication chan-
nels between applications by utilizing social links exist-
ing in various social networking sites.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we design a pollution-free P2P content
sharing system, Green. In Green, a content provider
(i.e., creator or sharer) publishes the information of his
shared contents into a security overlay; in order to ob-
tain the authentic contents, a content requestor can uti-
lize the inherent content-based information to perform
the proactive filtering and realtime verification, and uti-
lize the traditional reputation information and the social
information to perform the social-based reputation com-
putation. Green is broadly applicable for both structured
and unstructured overlay applications. The analysis and
prototype-based evaluation (in massive-scale networks
with realistic traces) indicate that Green is able to defend
against the content pollution effectively and efficiently.
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